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Abstract
This paper studies a target-based procedure to rank lotteries that is norma-
tively and observationally equivalent to the expected utility model. In view
of this equivalence, the traditional utility-based language for decision mak-
ing may be substituted with an alternative target-based language. Switch-
ing language may have signiﬁcant modelling consequences. To exemplify, we
contrast the utility-based viewpoint of prospect theory against the target-
based viewpoint and provide an explanation of Allais’ paradox based on
context dependence instead of distorted probabilities.
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University.1 Introduction
Suppose that a greedy agent must rank n monetary lotteries X1,X 2,...,X n.
The agent does not know how to compare two lotteries, so he must use some
ranking procedure. Here is a possible one. The agent selects a target t and
ranks a lottery X by the probability P(X ≥ t) that it meets the target;
see Manski (1988). However, the agent may not know for sure which target
he should select. Then he could replace the sure target t with a random
variable T representing his uncertain target and rank a lottery X by the
probability P(X ≥ T) that it meets his uncertain target. We call this the
target-based procedure.
Another possible ranking procedure is based on the expected utility
model. The agent selects a utility function U over money and ranks a lottery
X by its expected utility EU(X). We call this the utility-based procedure.
For future use, note that the utility function U is unique up to increasing
aﬃne transformations: we say for short that U is cardinal.
A natural question is which one of the two procedures is better. The
answer, however, depends on what we mean by “better”. One possible
approach is to take a normative point of view and interpret “better” as
“more rational”. Another approach is to consider revealed preferences and
interpret “better” as “closer to observed choice behavior”. Thus, we may
ask two diﬀerent questions.
Which one of the two procedures is more rational? Which one is closer
to the observed choice behavior? Both questions have the same surprising
answer: neither one — they are equivalent! If an agent applies the target-
based procedure, he behaves as if he is maximizing the expected value of
a utility function. Vice versa, if he follows the utility-based procedure, he
acts as if he is maximizing the probability to meet an uncertain target.
We show below why the two procedures are both mathematically and
observationally equivalent. For the moment, just note that this implies that
any axiomatic foundation for the utility-based procedure works as well for
the target-based procedure. Analogously, any choice behavior which can be
rationalized by the expected utility model ﬁts equally well the target-based
model.
These two equivalence statements would seem to leave no room for in-
teresting questions. There are two diﬀerent procedures, but only one basic
model for decision making.
Yet, there is one important diﬀerence that we should explore. Many, if
not all, nonexpected utility models have been suggested as ways to amend
the expected utility model against a mounting contrary empirical evidence.
1Most of these models maintained the notion of a cardinal utility function or,
more generally, were framed in a utility-based language. Instead, the target-
based model assumes no comprehension of cardinal utilities: it is phrased in
a language that requires only an understanding of probabilities.
The target-based approach and the utility-based approach invoke two
diﬀerent languages. Which languages is chosen to amend the basic model
(be it expected utility or the equivalent target-based procedure) may aﬀect
the descriptive power and the plausibility of our models.
To exemplify, consider the prospect theory put forth in Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), which is still one of the best and most complete descriptive
models for decision making under risk. Prospect theory was built in three
steps, heavily inspired by the expected utility model. First, Kahneman and
Tversky amassed a tremendous amount of empirical evidence and compared
it with the predictions of the expected utility model. A good chunk of the
evidence was compatible, while the rest led to the so called choice anomalies.
Second, they ﬁt the compatible evidence coming up with a characteristic
shape for the cardinal utility function. Third, they modiﬁed some pieces
of the expected utility model to ﬁt the choice anomalies, ending up with
a nonexpected utility model based on the distorted probabilities suggested
ﬁrst in Edwards (1955, 1962).
To use an analogy, Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory did for
expected utility what Ptolemy’s epicycles did for the geocentric theory. But
what would happen if prospect theory would be worked out using a target-
based language? Maybe we might have an explanation for the choice anoma-
lies more convincing than Kahneman and Tversky’s story about probability
distortions. And if this were the case, the target-based language should be
deemed descriptively richer than the utility-based language.
This paper studies whether the target-based language can stake the claim
of being descriptively richer than the utility-based language. We test its
power against Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory. We are well aware
that there are many competitors in the race to oﬀer better descriptive mod-
els, including the cumulative prospect theory later developed in Kahneman
and Tversky (1992). However, prospect theory has a few advantages that
make it the ideal benchmark: it is simple to explain, it is more widely
known and it misses none of the essential elements that should enter into a
descriptive theory of decision making.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the
equivalence of the target-based model and of the expected utility model.
Section 3 summarizes prospect theory and discusses the key descriptive as-
sumptions that it imposes on the utility function. Section 4 applies the
2target-based language to provide an explanation for these assumptions. Sec-
tion 5 reviews the choice anomalies and how prospect theory deals with
them. Section 6 applies the target-based language to this experimental ev-
idence and provides an alternative descriptive theory. Section 7 compares
the advantages of the target-based language versus the advantages of the
utility-based language and draws some conclusions.
2 Two equivalent procedures
The purpose of this section is to establish the equivalence of the target-based
procedure and the utility-based procedure. For simplicity we discuss only
the case of decision making under risk, where the outcomes are monetary and
the probability distributions are already known to the agent. See Castagnoli
and LiCalzi (1996) for arbitrary prizes under risk and Bordley and LiCalzi
(1999) for arbitrary prizes under uncertainty in the setting of Savage’s (1954)
theory of subjective expected utility.
Some formalities will be useful. Let Y ⊂ IR be a nonempty set of mon-
etary outcomes and let L be the set of all lotteries on Y . The set Y is
completely preordered by the “greater than” preference relation ≥, which
represents a greedy agent. If X is a lottery in L and F is its cumulative
distribution function (c.d.f.), we write X ∼ F. Given an outcome y in Y ,
we denote by y∗ the degenerate lottery in L yielding y for sure.
We show that the target-based procedure and the utility-based procedure
are equivalent by proving that they are equivalent to a third (apparently)
more general ranking procedure; see Churchman and Ackoﬀ (1954). A rank-
ing procedure induces a preference relation   on L. There are many ways
to describe a ranking procedure, but the simplest one is to deﬁne a value
function v : L→IR and rank X1   X2 if and only if v(X1) ≥ v(X2). Any
value function v represents a ranking procedure over L. We assume that the
ranking given by v is consistent with the greedy preference relation ≥ on Y :
y1 ≥ y2 if and only if v(y∗
1) ≥ v(y∗
2).
We consider the class of ranking procedures associated with value func-
tions that are (weakly continuous and) linear in the probability distributions;





where W(x):Y → IR is a real-valued, bounded, continuous, increasing, and
cardinal weight function. As it is well-known, the independence axiom and
3the continuity of   (in the weak topology) are a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the existence of a linear ranking procedure; see for instance
Theorem 3 in Grandmont (1972). This characterization result, however, is
conspicuously silent about how we should interpret the weight function W.
To provide an interpretation, we need to turn to a language. Let us bring
in the two procedures described in the introduction. Following the target-
based model, the agent must ﬁrst subjectively assess the c.d.f. P(x   T)
of his uncertain target T, which we assume stochastically independent of
the lotteries in L. Then, he evaluates a lottery X ∼ F using the ranking





This ranking procedure coincides with the class in (1) because, since W(x)
is bounded and cardinal, we can normalize its range to [0,1] and let P(x ≥
T)=W(x). The target-based procedure is a linear ranking procedure,
where the weight function W(x) is interpreted as the c.d.f. P(x ≥ T)o fa n
uncertain target T.
Following the expected utility model, the agent must ﬁrst subjectively
assess his cardinal utility function U : Y → IR. Then, he evaluates a lottery





Again, if we let U(x)=W(x), this ranking procedure coincides with the class
in (1). The expected utility procedure is also a linear ranking procedure,
where the weight function W(x) is interpreted as the cardinal utility function
U(x).
Each of the two interpretations needs some exogenous component, which
is left for the agent to be subjectively assessed. The target-based language
requires a stochastically independent uncertain target T. The utility-based
language requires a utility function that is unique up to aﬃne increasing
transformations. In our opinion, neither requirement can claim to be more
plausible than the other. And, in any case, both conform to (1); therefore,
the two procedures share the same axiomatic foundations and are observa-
tionally equivalent.
How do we move from one procedure to the other? We can bypass the
weight function W(x) and check directly when v1 and v2 deﬁne the same
ranking. After a normalization, the two equalities P(x ≥ T)=W(x)=U(x)
4must hold. Hence, the two procedures are equivalent if we let
P(x ≥ T)=U(x).
To put it diﬀerently, the equivalence follows if we think of the “old” cardinal
utility of x as the probability that the uncertain target T is not greater than
x: that is, if we interpret U(100) as the probability that the agent’s target
is not greater than 100 euros, rather than as the cardinal utility of 100 euros
for the agent.
This somewhat surprising equation is the major piece of the “dictionary”
to translate the target-based language into the utility-based language and
vice versa. We use this translating device throughout the rest of the paper;
see Berhold (1973), Borch (1968) or Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996) for a few
(mutually independent) excursions on this theme.
3 Prospect theory and the utility function
The major purpose of this paper is to compare the potential descriptive
power of a target-based language versus the successes of the utility-based
language. To provide material for this comparison, this section and Sec-
tion 5 review the major propositions of the prospect theory developed by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to account for the empirical evidence against
the expected utility model. For a broader perspective on prospect theory
and behavioral decision theory see Thaler (1987).
Prospect theory deals with decision making under risk, where the prob-
ability distributions of the lotteries are known to the agent. The theory is
developed only for monetary lotteries with ﬁnite support. To ensure maxi-
mum consistency, we restrict attention to ﬁnite lotteries over money and, in
this section, we strictly adhere to a utility-based language.
Prospect theory has four major assumptions. The ﬁrst one is that there
is a preliminary editing phase, during which outcomes and probabilities of
the lotteries may be transformed. Typical phenomena that may occur during
this phase are the coding of outcomes as gains and losses, the segregation
of riskless components or the rounding of probabilities. The editing phase
is crucial to understanding how the agent perceives a lottery. Much of what
goes on in a ranking task probably takes place at this stage. However, since
the editing phase is carried out before any cardinal utility function enters
the picture, we do not need to examine it in greater detail.
The other three major assumptions are: (i) there exists a utility function
U over outcomes; (ii) there exists a probability distorsion function π which
5describes how the agent perceives (or weighs) the known probabilities: more
precisely, if a lottery X has the probability distribution p, the probability pi
of an outcome xi occurring is perceived as π(pi); (iii) there exists a ranking
procedure which combines utilities and (distorted) probabilities.
Prospect theory assumes that the ranking procedure is linear in the
distorted probabilities. In other words, the ranking procedure is generated





which is linear in π but not in p. Therefore, prospect theory postulates a
model which in general is not linear in the known probabilities. Given the
similarity of (3) to a linear ranking procedure, it should be apparent how
little prospect theory tries to part away from the expected utility model.
Based on the assumption that the ranking procedure is linear in the dis-
torted probabilities, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) examines the empirical
evidence and deduces what properties U and π should satisfy to make (3)
compatible with it. In the rest of this section, we consider what prospect
theory has to say about U.
The utility function
Prospect theory summarizes the empirical evidence about the utility func-
tion U in three eﬀects that have a clear psychological interpretation:
(i) Lack of asset integration: people are concerned about changes with re-
spect to some reference point, rather than about their ﬁnal state of
wealth.
(ii) Reﬂection eﬀect: the marginal impact of both positive changes (gains)
and negative changes (losses) decreases with their magnitudes.
(iii) Loss aversion: losses loom larger than gains of equivalent amount.
Both Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the subsequent literature have
qualiﬁed these properties in many ways. In particular, the empirical evi-
dence which supports them is not always as clear-cut as one might wish.
Overall, however, these properties are a robust summary of many indepen-
dent experiments.
The following proposition states how they can be formalized and made
to ﬁt both the expected utility model in (2) and the prospect theory of (3).
Given a reference point r, we call gains and losses those outcomes that are
respectively coded as positive or negative changes (with respect to r).
6Proposition 1 Given either the expected utility model or the prospect the-
ory, the following three characterizations hold.
(i) Lack of asset integration holds if and only if the utility function U is
deﬁned over changes with respect to some reference point.
(ii) The reﬂection eﬀect holds if and only if U is concave over gains and
convex over losses.
(iii) Loss aversion holds if and only if U is steeper over losses than over
gains.
This characterization is a descriptive result, stating which properties of
U must be assumed to make (2) or (3) compatible with the experimental
ﬁndings. However, the proposition does not tell us why the three eﬀects
occur. What brings about lack of asset integration, the reﬂection eﬀect and
loss aversion is accounted for but not explained.
4 A target-based explanation
We can apply the target-based language to oﬀer an explanation for all the
three eﬀects described in the previous section. Our purpose is not to derive
an alternative mathematical theorem: Proposition 1 accounts for the ex-
perimental evidence in an elegant and simple way. Our intent is to explain
what may bring about precisely the properties described by Proposition 1.
We already know the “what?”; this section looks at the “why?”.
We begin with the explanation for the lack of asset integration suggested
by the target-based language. Suppose for a moment that the agent has a
known target. When he evaluates an outcome, there is a natural sense in
which this is good or bad: it meets the target or it does not. The good
outcomes are coded as gains and the bad outcomes are coded as losses.
When the target is uncertain, the mental process of pitting an outcome
against an uncertain target is still dichotomous: if an outcome represents
a change that improves his chances of meeting the target, the agent codes
it as a gain; otherwise, as a loss. Proposition 1.(i) is the mathematical
representation of a classiﬁcation task.
We now move to the reﬂection eﬀect. Assume for simplicity that the
uncertain target T has a probability density τ(x) and consider which kind
of probability density for the target would generate the reﬂection eﬀect.
The reﬂection eﬀect states that P(x ≥ T)=U(x) is concave over gains and
convex over losses. Since τ(x) is the derivative of the c.d.f. P(x ≥ T)=U(x),
7τ (x)
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the probability density would have to be decreasing over the domain of gains
and increasing over the domain of losses; that is, τ should be unimodal
around the reference point. See Figure 1, where the modal target is coded
as the reference point (conventionally, the 0 outcome).
Figure 1: A unimodal probability density for the target.
Hence, the reﬂection eﬀect follows from a subjective assessment that
there is one modal outcome for the uncertain target (which acts as a refer-
ence point) and that the probability of the target being diﬀerent from the
reference point is decreasing as we move away from it. Proposition 1.(ii) is
the mathematical representation of a probability judgement.
As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) diﬀusely point out, the reference point
used to code outcomes may diﬀer from the status quo or may shift over time.
In the target-based language, we equate the reference point with the modal
outcome of the distribution. Therefore, the mode of the uncertain target
may diﬀer from the status quo or may shift over time. This is plausible
and consistent with the assumption that the target is subjectively assessed.
Depending on the structure of the problem, we may expect that the most
likely target is diﬀerent from the current outcome. And as we obtain more
information, we may update the distribution of the target so that the modal
outcome would shift over time.
Incidentally, it is worthwhile to pause and note which kind of proba-
bility distribution for the target would generate risk averse behavior over
all lotteries. Since risk aversion follows from a concave U(x)=P(x ≥ T),
this implies that the density function τ should be decreasing; see Figure 2.
Hence, risk aversion follows from a conservative evaluation which ascribes
high probability to the uncertain target being a low outcome. This oﬀers an
explanation for which psychological factors may lay behind the characteri-
zation of risk aversion as concavity of the cardinal utility function.
8τ (x)
Figure 2: A conservative assessment of the target.
The third and last eﬀect to examine is loss aversion under risk, which
states that P(x ≥ T)=U(x) has a higher derivative over losses than over
gains of equivalent amount. This property has an ambiguous interpretation,
because Kahneman and Tversky (1979) does not specify the admissible range
of gains and losses. If this range is IR, loss aversion implies U (x) <U  (−x)
for all x>0. On the other hand, if losses are bounded below by −b,i t
suﬃces that U (x) <U  (−x) for all x in (0,b). The picture on p. 279of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the literature suggest the second in-
terpretation. Although the target-based language may accommodate either
case, we also adopt this second interpretation because it is more realistic:
losses are usually bounded below, at worst by bankruptcy.
Given this interpretation, since τ(x) is the derivative of the c.d.f. P(x ≥
T)=U(x), the reﬂection eﬀect requires τ(x) <τ (−x) over some (possibly
large) interval (0,b) of the reference point. This implies that the probability
density for the target should be asymmetric around the modal outcome; see
Figure 3 for two examples.
Loss aversion follows from a subjective judgement that expects targets
just below the reference point to be more likely than those just above it.
Proposition 1.(iii) is the mathematical representation of a prudential atti-
tude in the evaluation of the uncertain target.
There is a variety of distributions that may be consistent with this pru-
dential attitude. The picture on the left of Figure 3 shows that the probabil-
ity of the target being very high must not necessarily be small: for example,
a college student may sets her reference point equal to her low current en-
dowment, while still nourishing great expectations about herself. On the
other hand, the picture on the right shows that the probability of the target
9τ  (x) 2 
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Figure 3: Two asymmetric assessments of the target.
being high can be small: for example, an established banker may feel that
there is no much room left to improve on his reference point. These two
cases would exhibit markedly diﬀerent values for the slopes of U(x)i na
neighborhood of 0.
In spite of its intuitive plausibility, risk seeking behavior over losses has
received less empirical support than than the other two eﬀects; for instance,
Bernstein et alii (1997) do not ﬁnd any evidence of it. The variety of com-
patible distributions for the target suggests that some experiments may have
failed to recognize it only because their design could not take into account
diﬀerences across people in the assessments of their targets. It is to be hoped
that this target-based conjecture will be put under experimental testing.
5 Choice anomalies and decision weights
In this section we go back to prospect theory and to a utility-based language.
Whichever their explanation may be, the mathematical properties of the
utility function collected in Proposition 1 do not suﬃce to account for all
the empirical evidence. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) report a few choice
anomalies that invalidate the expected utility model in (2), but may be
accommodated by introducing the distorted probabilities of the nonlinear
ranking procedure in (3). To convey the ﬂavor of their argument, it will be
enough to look at four experiments chosen from the rich corpus of choice
anomalies.
10Allais’ paradox
The ﬁrst experiment is the well-known Allais’ paradox. We recall it in one of
its versions, dubbed as Problems 1 and 2 in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).






















most people (83%) pick C. These two modal choices together are incompat-
ible with the expected utility model.
Allais’ paradox has stimulated many nonexpected utility models that
can account for this choice anomaly; see for instance Machina (1982) and
Gul (1991). Most of these models share the intuition that people seem to
give a disproportionate weight to lottery B, because it oﬀers a sure gain of
2400. For this reason, this choice anomaly is also known as the certainty
eﬀect.
The certainty eﬀect occurs even with two-outcome gambles. For in-
stance, consider Problems 3 and 4 in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). When



















most people (65%) pick C. Again, the two modal choices together run
against the expected utility model.
In fact, the certainty eﬀect is so robust that it persists even in a setting
where lottery B oﬀers only a very likely gain, but not the certainty of it.
For example, in Problems 7 and 8 in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the
11usual pattern of B (86% of choices) and C (73% of choices) is replicated




















This led to an empirical generalization of the Allais’ paradox known as the
common ratio eﬀect: suppose that a lottery oﬀering y with probability q
(and nothing otherwise) is deemed indiﬀerent to another lottery oﬀering
x<ywith probability p>q(and nothing otherwise); then, for 0 <r<1,
a third lottery oﬀering y with probability qr is preferred to a fourth lottery
oﬀering x with probability pr.
The reverse Allais’ paradox
A puzzling companion to the traditional Allais’ paradox is the reverse Allais’
paradox, which occurs when we change the sign of all the outcomes in the
original formulation. For instance, take the two pairs of lotteries in (6) and
(7) and change the sign of all the outcomes. These are Problems 3’ and 4’
in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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most people (58%) pick D . Preferences are reversed when we transform
gains into losses. This is remarkable because we rarely observe a paired
choice of A and D when the Allais’ paradox is formulated over gains. In the
words of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), “certainty increases the aversive-
ness of losses as well as the desiderability of gains”.
12Distorted probabilities
None of the four choice anomalies mentioned is compatible with a linear
ranking procedure like the expected utility model. If we want a model that
can account for them, we need to alter some feature of the linear ranking pro-
cedure. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) followed Edwards (1955, 1962) and
took the route of altering the probabilities with a probability distorsion func-
tion π. This function maps the known probability p into a diﬀerent value
π(p), still in [0,1]. The distorted probabilities, called “decision weights”,
may not obey the probability axioms and should not be interpreted as al-
ternate subjective probabilities.
The introduction of decision weights in conjunction with the ranking
procedure in (3) can account for many choice anomalies. For example, the
Allais’ paradox of (4)–(5) can be generated by the property that very low
probabilities are overweighted; that is, π(p) >pif p is small. Or, more
generally, the common ratio eﬀect can be obtained if the decision weights
satisfy the subproportionality property that π(q)/π(p) ≤ π(qr)/π(pr), for
all p>qand r in (0,1).
It is not necessary to delve into the technicalities of decision weights
to make our point. If a reasonably complete “explanation” of all the choice
anomalies listed in Kahneman and Tversky is to be found in the introduction
of decision weights, the distorsion function has to be very complicated; see
Prelec (1998). For instance, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) end up assuming
that π satisﬁes ﬁve properties so stringent that, if we add the requirement
that the distorsion function π be continuous, it is impossible to satisfy them
simultaneously. This raises two problems.
The ﬁrst one is that, whereas the clarity and elegance of the assumptions
on the utility function are obvious, the distorsion function seems convoluted.
The obvious reply is that a descriptive model does not have to be simple:
it has to work. To follow up the analogy in the introduction, this is the
argument used to defend Ptolemy’s epicycles.
The second major problem is that what decision weights represent or
how they should be interpreted is left unexplained. Silence on this problem
reigns even in Hogarth and Einhorn (1990), whose stated purpose is to
complete prospect theory by giving a descriptive model of how people assess
decision weights for probabilities. Nor has any light on this problem been
shed by the huge literature dealing with nonlinear ranking procedures based
on distorted probabilities, including the well-known class of rank-dependent
utility models initiated by Quiggin (1982) and Yaari (1987).
136 A target-based descriptive theory
This section completes Section 4 by providing a target-based descriptive
theory that explains the experimental evidence presented in Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). Our purpose is to show that two simple modelling tools
can account for all choice anomalies of Section 5. Therefore, combining the
editing phase from prospect theory, the target-based explanation of Propo-
sition 1 from Section 4 and these two tools, we obtain an alternative theory
with the same descriptive power of prospect theory.
Context-dependence
Let us go back to the Allais’ paradox described in (4) and (5) in Section 4.
Its standard explanation has two parts. First, since most people are risk-
averse, the modal choices should be A over B and C over D. Thus, in some
sense, the paradox lies in the choice of B. The second part aims to explain
why most subjects choose B.
When comparing lotteries A and B, people tend to give a disproportion-
ate weight to lottery B. In Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) words, “people
overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which
are merely probable.” Prospect theory does not capture this intuition be-
cause it accounts for Allais’ paradox by assuming that the small probability
of obtaining 0 in lottery A is overweighted, rather than by overweighting the
sure payoﬀ of 2400 in B. Based on the target-based language, we can oﬀer
a model for the second part of this explanation which is closer to intuition.
The agent who comes to the laboratory has some kind of uncertain target
in mind. For instance, he has expectations about how much he might win
(or be paid). Unless there is a contrary reason, he assesses the lotteries he
is oﬀered using this uncertain target. However, if the context provides a
strong cue, he may update the prior distribution of the target and use the
posterior distribution for the ranking.
We believe that context-dependence is the leading force behind Allais’
paradox. When one of the feasible lotteries oﬀers a sure gain of 2400, the
agent takes this into account and revises his prior distribution for the target.
If there is money to be made for sure, this salient piece of information may
be used to update the initial assessment of the target. Consistent with
intuition, the updating should increase the probability that the uncertain
target is 2400.
How do we model this context-dependence of the uncertain target? From
a normative point of view, this would require setting up a Bayesian problem
14in which the uncertain target T has a prior distribution P0(x ≥ T)=F0
T(x)
that is updated into a posterior distribution P1(x ≥ T)=F1
T(x) by using
the information contained in the pair of lotteries (4) which is presented to
the agent. This could be made in many ways, but probably they would
all be too complicated to serve the simple descriptive purpose we are after.
Therefore, we suggest a much simpler model that captures the essential
features of Bayesian updating.
Let F0
T be the prior c.d.f. of the target and let F1(x) and F2(x)b e
respectively the c.d.f. of the ﬁrst and the second lottery in the pair. For
instance, if the pair of lotteries oﬀered is (4), F1(x) is the c.d.f. of lottery A
and F2(x) is the c.d.f. of lottery B. Let F1
T(x) be the posterior distribution
of the target, given the pair of lotteries oﬀered to the agent. Then F1
T should
depend on the prior F0
T and on the contextual distributions F1 and F2.
We assume that the posterior distribution F1
T is a convex combination
of F0




with α0 + α1 + α2 = 1 and αi ≥ 0 for i =1 ,2,3. We also assume that
the lotteries oﬀered are evaluated using a stochastically independent target
T distributed according to F1
T. Note that the lotteries oﬀered may aﬀect
the distribution of the target; however, once the posterior distribution is
obtained, the ranking procedure is still linear because of the stochastic in-
dependence of T.
Even if simple, the updating rule in (12) oﬀers many degrees of freedom.
For convenience, we make two assumptions which entail no loss of general-
ity. We explain these assumptions with reference to the Allais’ paradox of
Problems (4) and (5), but they are also used throughout the rest of the pa-
per. First, we assume that the support of the prior distribution of the target
is the interval between the minimum and the maximum outcome across all
oﬀered lotteries; that is, [0,2500]. Second, we assume that without context-
dependence the agent would be risk-neutral; that is, the prior distribution
F0
T(x)=U(x) is linear over its support. This linearity amounts to saying
that that the prior c.d.f. F0
T(x) is uniform.
Appendix A.2 shows that relaxing these assumptions by assuming a
larger support or some degree of risk aversion would only make the choice
of A over B less likely. Therefore, the “paradoxical” choice of B cannot
be an artifact of these two assumptions. It is also easy to check that our
assumptions imply that C is preferred to D.
The context-dependent explanation of the Allais’ paradox is that the
posterior distribution F1
T puts a substantial weight on the lottery B which
15oﬀers a sure gain of 2400. In our model, the weight on lottery B is α2. As-
suming that the agent follows a target-based procedure where the posterior
distribution of the uncertain target is given by (12), Appendix A.1 shows
that the agent prefers B to A if the α’s satisfy the restriction (.0036)α0 ≤
(.01)α2 − (.1023)α1.
Assuming that lottery A has no contextual weight, let α1 = 0. Then
α0 =1− α2. Substituting, we obtain that B is preferred to A for α2 ≥
(.36)/(1.36) ≈ .2647. That is, if the contextual weight of B is at least
.27, then people would choose B over A. An increase of about 27% in
the probability that the uncertain target is at least 2400 can explain the
anomaly in Allais’ paradox. The necessary increase would be even lower if
we assumed risk aversion or a larger support for the prior target.
Contrast this with the explanation based on the distorted probabilities
of prospect theory. It accounts for the choice of B by assuming that the
probability .01 of winning 0 in lottery A is distorted to π(.01) >. 01, which
makes A less appealing. While the target-based explanation stresses the
salience of B, prospect theory opts to downgrade the competing alternative.
This target-based explanation is robust. For instance, if we repeat a
similar argument for (6) we ﬁnd that α2 ≥ .2 suﬃces to explain the choice
of B; see Appendix A.3. In fact, all the anomalies reported in Kahneman
and Tversky can be explained by a value of α2 not higher than the α2 = 27%
found above for the Allais’ paradox.
The explanation also applies to cases like (8) and (9), where any risk-
neutral agent is indiﬀerent over the lotteries in each pair. Assuming any
degree of (strict) risk aversion, we would expect the choice of B over A and
D over C. Therefore, the source of the anomaly here is the choice of C.
By (16) in Appendix A.4, this choice would follow if the contextual weights
are such that α1 ≥ 2α2 + K, where K is a suitable positive constant. The
contextual importance of C should be more than twice as large as D’s. This
result is consistent with the intuition that people probably ﬁnd C salient
because it associates a richer outcome with a very low probability of winning.
Avoiding losses
Besides context-dependence, a descriptive explanation of the reverse Allais’
paradox of (10) and (11) should incorporate an assumption analogous to loss
aversion. The target-based procedure should be slightly diﬀerent when the
problem is framed exclusively in terms of gains or of losses. When dealing
with gains, we assume that barely making the target is good and therefore
that the agent tries to maximize P(X ≥ T). Instead, when dealing with
16losses, we assume that just making the target is bad and thus that the agent
tries to maximize P(X>T ) or, equivalently, to minimize P(X ≤ T).
This assumption aﬀects only the cases where P(X = T) > 0, which occur
in our examples simply because the distribution of the lotteries involved are
discrete. Whenever at least one between the distributions of T and X is
absolutely continuous, then P(X = T) = 0 and maximizing P(X ≥ T)o r
P(X>T ) would be equivalent.
Under this slightly modiﬁed target-based rule, we can apply the context-
dependent model used before to account for the choice of A  in (10) and of
D  in (11); see Appendix A.5. Under our usual simplifying assumptions, the
choice of A  over B  can be explained exactly by the same equation already
obtained for (6): if the contextual weight of B  is at least .2, the salience
of the certain outcome in B  leads the agent to prefer A  in the attempt to
prevent a sure loss.
7 Comparing languages
A large part of decision theory is framed in a utility-based language; see Ru-
binstein (1988) for a notable exception. There is no doubt that this language
has led to many successes and there is no question about its importance,
especially from a normative viewpoint. This section tries to assess the po-
tentialities of the target-based language for the theory of decision making
against the benchmark of the utility-based language.
How do we judge if a language A is better than another language B?
The answer depends on our purposes, but the following four criteria should
be part of the answer:
(i) Expressiveness: is A at least as powerful as B for our purposes? In
particular, can it ﬁt everything we can say in the old language?
(ii) Ease of use: is A at least as easy to learn and use as B?
(iii) Explanatory power: does A lead to new concepts or to “better” expla-
nations?
(iv) Relevance: can A handle interesting problems? In particular, can it
handle problems that are relevant to economics?
We evaluate the target-based language on the basis of the ﬁrst three criteria
and advance some suggestions about the fourth criterion.
17Expressiveness. As shown in Section 2, the target-based language and
the utility-based language have the same mathematical description. There-
fore, anything that can be formalized in one language can also be formalized
in the other one. For example, the normative foundations of expected utility
equally apply for the target-based procedure. As a formal language, there-
fore, the target-based language is at least as expressive as the utility-based
language.
Ease of use. The target-based language is phrased entirely in the lan-
guage of probability. Since it does not require an understanding of cardinal
utilities, it is simpler to explain and to use. For example, instead of es-
timating U(x) using the standard utility-based elicitation procedures, we
might ask the agent to draw the density function for his target and esti-
mate his c.d.f. from there. For another example, consider the problem of
interpersonal comparison of cardinal utilities: what are the implications of
U1(x) >U 2(x)? In the target-based language, this diﬃcult question trans-
lates into a comparison between the probability that agent 1 attaches to his
target being less than x versus the probability that agent 2 assesses for her
target being less than x. Since subjective probabilities can be compared, a
target-based language may make this problem easier to attack.
Explanatory power. Section 4 and 6 were devoted to show that the
target-based language may oﬀer a descriptive theory alternative to prospect
theory. For example, we oﬀered a context-dependent explanation for the
Allais’ paradox as opposed to the distorsion of probabilities characteristic of
prospect theory. On this basis, we claim that the target-based language may
have at least as much explanatory power as one descriptive theory based on
the notion of utility.
Relevance. Judging the relevance (in particular to economics) of a lan-
guage is a very subjective task. Therefore we will not attempt it here.
However, we will try to suggest some problems which a target-based lan-
guage may model or attack more successfully than a utility-based language.
For instance, LiCalzi (1999) estimates bounds for the expected utility of par-
tially known lotteries which lead to simple dominance heuristics over limited
domains.
We begin with some modelling issues. We have already argued that if
we view U(x)=P(x ≥ T) as a probability distribution, we can update it on
the basis of new information. Therefore, we can model context-dependence
18as we did in Section 6. Or, we can model learning as the repeated updating
of U; see DellaVigna and LiCalzi (1999). More generally, we should be able
to model a situation where preferences are path-dependent, in the sense that
which targets a person sets for herself depends on her past experiences. Note
also that the target-based language is extremely well-suited to deal with
the satisﬁcing approach proposed in Simon (1955) for modelling bounded
rationality.
Economic problems for which the target-based language may oﬀer inter-
esting suggestions include the following: bargaining (what is my opponent’s
target?), ultimatum games (acceptance of low payoﬀs depends on the tar-
get), search behavior (acceptance is conditional on the target), purchase
of lottery tickets (certainly justiﬁable when the target is becoming million-
aires). A recent paper by Shaﬁr, Diamond and Tversky (1997) looks at
money illusion: we conjecture that this occurs when an agent formulates his
target in real values but faces lotteries denominated in nominal values.
Finally, the target-based language may lead to a diﬀerent viewpoint on
decision making. The three oﬃcial approaches in decision theory are nor-
mative (telling people what they should do), prescriptive (helping people
to fulﬁll the normative criteria), and descriptive (accounting for what peo-
ple actually do); see Bell, Raiﬀa and Tversky (1988). We would like to
suggest that these three approaches could be usefully complemented by a
fourth constructive approach, which should explain how people construct
their preferences whenever they do not happen to know them already. Both
the target-based procedure and the expected utility procedure in the intro-
duction were discussed in this perspective; see Chapter 5 in Payne et alii
(1993) for related ideas.
Appendix
A.1 Allais’ paradox. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) considers only choices
over pairs of lotteries concerning (at most) three elements. Therefore, we
















with x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3.
According to the target-based model, when called to choose between
X and Y , the agent would maximize the probability of meeting an uncer-
tain target T distributed according to the c.d.f. U(x). For lottery X, this
19probability is




where the last equality follows from U(x)=P(x ≥ T).
When there is context-dependence, we follow Section 6 and replace U(x)




where F1 and F2 are respectively the c.d.f.’s of lottery X and Y . Therefore,













Consider the pair of lotteries A and B in (6). Applying (13), the value














T( 0 )+( .01)α1
 
.
Analogously, the value of B is
 
α0F0
T(2400) + (.67)α1 + α2
 
.







α0 ≥ (.1023)α1 − (.01)α2.
Suppose that F0
T is uniformly distributed on [0,2500]. Then F0
T(2500) = 1,
F0
T(2400) = .96, and F0
T(0) = 0. Therefore, the inequality becomes
−(.0036)α0 ≥ (.1023)α1 − (.01)α2. (14)
A.2 No loss of generality. Both the assumption that F0
T has a sup-
port (strictly) including the interval [0,2500] and that F0
T is concave (which
corresponds to risk aversion) imply that the left-hand side of (14) would
be greater and therefore that a lower value of α2 would suﬃce to make B
preferred to A. Therefore, we can conclude that a contextual weight for
lottery B higher than .2647 can explain the choice of B over A in the Allais’
paradox under the assumption of Section 6.
20A.3 Another pair. Consider the pair of lotteries A and B in (4). Apply-
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and the value of B is
 
α0F0
T(3000) + (.20)α1 + α2
 
. Then B is preferred to







α0 ≥ (.64)α1 − (.20)α2.
For F0
T uniformly distributed on [0,4000], we have F0
T(4000) = 1, F0
T(3000) =
.75, and F0
T(0) = 0. Therefore, this inequality becomes
−(.05)α0 ≥ (.64)α1 − (.20)α2. (15)
Letting α1 = 0 and α0 =1− α2, we obtain that B is preferred to A for
α2 ≥ (1/5).
A.4 A pair of fair gambles. Consider the pair of lotteries C and D in
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T( 0 )+( .999)α1 +( .998)α2
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α0 + α1 ≥ 2α2.
Assuming risk aversion, the term in brackets is negative and therefore we
can rewrite this inequality as
α1 ≥ 2α2 + K, (16)
with K ≥ 0.
21A.5 Gambles over losses. Consider the pair of lotteries A  and B  in
(10). Instead of using P(X ≥ T) as the value function for a lottery X,w e
use P(X>T ). This only requires that we substitute the left limit F(x−)
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. Then A  is preferred to







α0 ≥ (.64)α1 − (.20)α2.
For F0




T(0−) = 1. Therefore, this inequality becomes
−(.05)α0 ≥ (.64)α1 − (.20)α2,
which is identical to (15). For α1 = 0 and α0 =1−α2, we obtain that A  is
preferred to B  for α2 ≥ (1/5).
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